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1. Introduction 
Quantum mechanics (QM) is complete in a precise sense. It cannot be supplemented by 
more informative descriptions of physical systems given certain reasonable assumptions; 
this is what the no-hidden-variables proofs show. Theorems of Kochen-Specker-type (KS 
theorems) crucially employ an assumption of context-independence of the observables 
considered while those of Bell-type theorems use an assumption of locality. Since locality 
amounts to context-independence of local observables the former theorems can be 
considered as more general than the latter. What exactly do these theorems show in terms of 
physics? In which sense do they prove QM to be complete? 
The standard answer to these questions is indeed older than the theorems themselves. It was 
given by the inventors of QM, notably von Neumann (who himself devised a no-hidden-
variables argument) and Dirac. It says that the mathematical entity representing the 
maximal QM information we can have about a system S represents all the physical 
properties that S has. This is an informative physical interpretation of the theorems. Since it 
embodies the idea that the QM information about S is the complete representation of its 
physical state it may be called the completeness assumption. 
In this paper, I will try to show that the completeness assumption is not the correct 
interpretation of the KS theorems for an ultimately simple reason: it cannot be squared with 
QM itself. The argument proceeds as follows. Initially, I explicate four properties of QM – 
properties not mentioned but represented in standard axiomatisations – that will drive the 
argument, and moreover cast the completeness assumption into a precise form: COMP 
(basically a weakened version of the well-known eigenstate-eigenvalue link) (sec.2). Then I 
consider the central equation of the QM statistical algorithm: the trace formula. From the 
QM properties I conclude that the formula must be explicated in one of two ways. Neither 
option, however, can be harmonised with both QM and a general probability principle 
(sec.3). I discuss whether the argument is just an involved form of the measurement 
problem or else unduly neglects the notion of QM measurement – both with a negative 
result (sec.4). I consider a fundamental objection that indeed circumvents the argument and 
show that it violates one of the four QM properties (sec.5). Finally, I briefly consider what 
the KS theorems tell us about QM given that the argument against COMP is correct (sec.6).  
2. Preliminaries 
2.1 Properties of quantum mechanics 
Initially, we must identify the features of QM needed for the argument. The theory can be 
introduced in various ways, hence comes in different versions but the four properties we 
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need are shared by all of them. I choose a standard formulation of QM, using the 
Schrödinger picture and density operators, and illustrate everything from there but the 
argument in no way hinges on this choice. Suppose that the standard formulation comes as 
a set of axioms. The number of the axioms and their individual details will differ but the 
axioms will rule three important things. First, there will be an axiom fixing the mathematical 
entity representing the state of a QM system S for a fixed time t0: a density operator W (t0) 
on an appropriate Hilbert space. Second, there will be an axiom ruling the time evolution of 
state W (t0): an equation W (t) = U (t) W (t0) U (t)–1 where U (t) = exp [–iHt] is a function of 
time, and H, possibly time-dependent (H = H(t)), is a unitary operator representing S’s total 
energy. Finally, there will be an axiom decreeing how QM generates predictions. It will 
either be or directly imply a statistical algorithm. Assuming a nondegenerate and discrete 
observable A on S with eigenvalues ai (with i = 1, 2, …) and ak an arbitrary one of the ai, one 
form of the algorithm will include an equivalent of the following equation: p (ak) = Tr (W Pak)), 
called the trace formula. Note that p (ak), on the left abbreviates p ([A] = ak) where ‘[A] = ak’ 
means ‘the value of A on S equals ak’ or equivalently ‘S has value ak of A’.  
This little sketch of one form of QM illustrates four crucial properties that it shares with all 
other forms. These properties are independent of the axiomatisation details. In particular, 
they are independent of: a) which specific form the statistical algorithm (often called the 
Born Rule) takes, wherein the trace formula ultimately resides; b) whether or not we have 
projection in QM. The properties are dependent on the Schrödinger picture but have 
counterparts in the Heisenberg picture such that an argument parallel to the one given here 
can be constructed. (I will, however, not try to show this and leave the Heisenberg picture 
mostly out of discussion.) The first property is this: 
Time Parameter Uniqueness: QM contains a unique time-parameter t.  
The time-parameter in QM has a clear role to play. Given an initial value t0 of t, variable 
values of t relate states to W (t0) by W (t) = U (t) W (t0) U (t)–1. The variable t can be assumed 
to take values ad libitum, but there is no second time parameter in QM. In particular, QM 
leaves no conceptual room for re-interpreting two occurrences of t in any QM equation as 
two independent parameters (t and t′, say) capable of taking different values. (The evolution 
equation W (t) = U (t) W (t0) U (t)–1 where t, if it takes a value, must take the same in all three 
places is one trivial example of this property.)  
The second property is a trivial consequence of the Schrödinger picture: 
Time Reference:  If QM ascribes to S a state W, then W = W (t), i.e. W is time-dependent 
throughout. 
Given W = W (t0), Time Reference is satisfied. Up to a measurement, all other states are 
produced from W (t0) via time evolution, so are time-dependent by construction. The 
situation will be different upon measurement – but only if we have a form of QM where 
unitary evolution is interrupted: projection. As I said, the argument below will be 
independent of whether or not QM contains a projection postulate because it employs just 
time-evolution up to a “first” measurement. But note that Time Reference is also 
respected, given projection, in the situation during or after a measurement. If we accept 
projection we assume a “collapse” of S’s state upon measurement of W (t1). There will be 
an immediate problem about specifying the time-reference for collapsed state W′. But 
collapse interpretations (like the GRW theory) usually assume that a collapsed state W′ 
can be an input for a new unitary evolution. For this to be possible, the collapsed state 
must also be time-dependent: W′ = W′ (t2) (where t1, t2 are two different values of the 
same parameter t). 
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State Uniqueness: If QM attributes a state W (t) to S, then for all W′ (t) attributed to S,  
W (t) = W′ (t).  
This property again is a trivial consequence of our using the Schrödinger picture. QM would 
break down if the state attributed to S per time were not unique. This would simply result in 
conflicting inputs for the trace formula, hence lead to conflicting predictions. 
The last property relates to the trace formula p (ak) = Tr (W Pak)) and may be called 
Generality. 
Generality: Given an arbitrary state W of S and an arbitrary observable A, it is the case that 
p (ak) = Tr (W Pak). 
The emphasis here is on arbitrary W and A. When representing a physical system in QM, we 
pick a Hilbert space whose dimension depends on the observables we are interested in. 
Given that such a choice has been made, Generality simply says that the trace formula holds 
good for all states and observables on that space.  
These four properties suffice to create a conflict with the completeness assumption that I call 
the completeness problem. Plainly, the properties are shared by all versions of QM using the 
Schrödinger picture and density operators. Moreover, they have counterparts in versions 
making other choices. I thus assume that QM as such leads to the completeness problem.  
2.2 Completeness 
KS theorems show the impossibility of assigning values to QM observables given essentially 
two constraints. These theorems translate the idea of assigning properties (values of 
observables) to S into the task of assigning values to operators forming a certain algebra. 
Because the algebra is non-Boolean it is possible to find finite sets of operators such that not 
all of them can consistently be assigned the real numbers that are the allowed values of the 
associated observables. One condition of the arguments is that the algebra is based on a 
Hilbert space H with dim H > 2. This condition is unquestionable because most QM systems 
require representation on a Hilbert space H with at least dim H = 3. But there are two 
substantial assumptions going into the theorems that can be questioned: (1) Algebraic 
relations among operators representing QM observables are mirrored exactly in the 
associated values; this is a condition known in the literature as Functional Composition.  
(2) There is a one-one correspondence between observables and the operators representing 
them; since this can be interpreted as an assumption of independence of any single 
observable from the observables considered in conjunction with it this condition is generally 
called Noncontextuality.1 Given these two assumptions, relations among operators translate 
straightforwardly into relations among values of observables that cannot simultaneously be 
satisfied.2 Trivially, all the sets of operators are such that they cannot all have one eigenstate 
in common. 
Generally, the completeness assumption is seen as being embodied in the so-called 
eigenstate-eigenvalue link (EE)3 stating that S has ak if and only if it is in the pertaining 
eigenstate Pak. Following this policy we can, as a first stab, rule this equivalence:  
                                                                 
1 See Redhead (1987, ch. 5) for a (by now classic) discussion. 
2 See Kochen and Specker (1967). For a simple and unified form of the Bell and Kochen-Specker 
theorems for two and three particles, see Mermin (1990); see also Held (2009). For the simplest Kochen-
Specker type arguments in three and more dimensions see the references in Bub (1999, 118-9). 
3 For the expression and a clear formulation see Fine (1973), 20. The link was first proposed, however, 
by Dirac (1930/1958, 46-7) and von Neumann (1932/1955, 253); see Bub (1999, 29) for a discussion.  
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 [A] = ak if and only if S is in Pak.  (*) 
This is insufficient, for a formal and a physical reason. In the Schrödinger picture due to 
Time Reference, the state is time-dependent: Pak = Pak (t). So in (*) there is an implicit time 
reference on the right. Now, while it is logically possible to have no matching time reference 
on the left this would clearly leave (*) incomplete. Moreover, the statement that [A] = ak is 
physically void if not referring to time concretely. In particular, we will want to tell stories 
such that at certain times it is true of S that [A] = ak, but not at certain others. The only 
natural way to make (*) meaningful formally and physically is explication on both sides: 
 [A] = ak at t if and only if S is in Pak (t). (EE)  
This is the full-fledged EE.4 One of its directions will suffice to make sense of the KS 
impossibility results. The ‘only if’-direction is: 
If S is not in Pak (t), then  [A] = ak at t. 
Now, we know (by State Uniqueness) that the state W (t) of S is unique, i.e. that if S is in a 
state W (t)  Pak, then S is not in Pak (t). Hence, from the ‘only if’ direction of EE: 
If S is in a state W (t)  Pak, then  [A] = ak at t. 
Let’s weaken this one step further – to see what is minimally needed to make sense of the 
results.5 Assume only that when S is in a pure state other than Pak (t), then it does not have ak 
at t. Identify this as our completeness assumption (COMP): 
 If S is in a pure state W (t)  Pak, then  [A] = ak at t. (COMP) 
COMP makes eminent physical sense of the KS impossibility results. Every KS set includes 
observables that do not all have one eigenstate in common. Whatever S’s state – if it’s a pure 
state then the set contains observables for which it is not an eigenstate. These observables do 
not have values while the others may have. The contradiction that would arise from 
attributing values to all observables is avoided.  
The crucial role of time in this reasoning should be made as explicit as possible. The starting 
point is that certain relations among values [A], [B], [C] … of certain observables A, B, C … 
(that do not all have one eigenstate in common) cannot jointly be satisfied. We want to 
concretize this in terms of physics in the sense that A, B, C … cannot all simultaneously have 
values. Suppose that we want to express that A has a value while B and C have none, at the 
same time t: ‘[A] = ak at t’, ‘ [A] = ai at t’ (for all i ≠ k), ‘ [B] = bi at t’ (for all i), ‘ [C] = ci at t’ 
(for all i). An interpretive principle can imply this set of propositions only if it provides time 
references for the value ascriptions. COMP does just this in the only conceivable way. It uses 
the time reference attached to state W (t) and transfers it to negations of value ascriptions. It 
is hence crucial to relate these negations to time t in order for COMP to explicate the 
interpretation of the KS results we intend.  
                                                                 
4 While I say that (*) must be explicated as EE to make formal and physical sense, a competing intuition has 
it that (*) is perfectly o.k. as an expression of the eigenstate-eigenvalue link and simply implies EE. The net 
result is the same, of course. We are entitled to proceed with EE as the legitimate explication of the link. 
5 This intention can also be put another way. The full EE is not needed to make sense of the KS results. 
Modal interpretations reject EE (assume that if S’s state is a reduction mixture, then it is possible that 
[A] = ak), but accept COMP. The ensuing argument creates a problem for these interpretations, too.  
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3. Main argument 
3.1 Explicating the trace formula 
From Time Reference, we know that the trace formula inevitably carries a time-reference on 
the right: p (ak) = Tr (W (t) Pak). This creates a problem that has been little discussed in the 
foundational literature. The equation has a time-reference on the right, but it is unclear 
whether and eventually where there is a matching one on the left. Does p (ak) also have a 
time-reference? If so it deserves to be explicated. Recall that p (ak) is the probability for the 
event referred to by proposition ‘[A] = ak’. So we interpret p (ai) as a probability function 
(for a fixed pair of operators) from a set of propositions into [0, 1]. So we can cast the 
problem in these questions: Is p (ak) a function of time? And if so, then in which sense is it 
such a function? 
The first question must be answered positively because of the composition of functions. The 
trace formula identifies a magnitude (a probability) that is a function of propositions 
(attributing to S the different eigenvalues of A) with another magnitude (the trace) that is a 
function of operators (state times measured observable) one of which in turn is a function of 
a certain parameter (time), hence the probability function is itself a function of the parameter 
(time).  
Now in which sense is p (ak) time-dependent? Since formally it is a function there are 
basically two possibilities. Either this function depends on t implicitly – ‘p (ak (t))’ – or 
explicitly – ‘p (ak, t)’. In the first case, it depends on time because its argument, the 
proposition ‘[A] = ak’, does. The argument then, in fact is the proposition ‘[A] = ak at t’. In 
the second case, it depends on two arguments directly, on the proposition ‘[A] = ak’ and on 
time t. For a clearer visual distinction I rewrite this second option as ‘p (t) (ak)’. 
Schematically then the explication must be either ‘p (ak (t))’ or ‘p (t) (ak)’. Of course, the 
index could also be in both places at once. I ignore this third possibility here but consider it 
below (in sec. 3.3). We have just seen that the index must turn up somewhere and these are 
the two minimal possibilities. For obvious reasons the first reading can be called the internal 
interpretation: 
p (ak (t)) = Tr (W (t) Pak). 
and the second the external interpretation:  
p (t) (ak) = Tr (W (t) Pak). 
These two are the only apparent choices. Without arguing for it further, I assume that there 
are no others. 
3.2 The internal interpretation 
I imagine that QM can be condensed into a number of theorems and, if applied to a certain 
system, a number of state specifications as necessary. I then can assume QM (applied to a 
certain system) to be a conjunction of theorems and state specifications. I can also speak of 
QM as a conjunct in a conjunction and henceforth will speak of the conjunction of QM and 
COMP (applied to system S with observable A) as complete QM.  
I begin with a fundamental idea about probability that I hope finds universal acceptance: 
Probability is quantified possibility. More precisely: If a physical theory assigns an event a 
non-zero probability, then, given the theory’s truth, this event is possible. The weakest form 
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of possibility is logical possibility. Using it we can implement the idea in the following 
probability principle: If a theory T for a proposition F (describing an event) yields another 
proposition p (F) > 0 then it must be compatible with F, i.e. it is not the case that the set {T, F} 
makes derivable a contradiction (in first-order logic, I shall assume).  
Now suppose that S is in a pure state W (t1)  Pak, for some value t1 of t, such that for the 
probability calculated from the trace formula it is the case that 1 > p (ak) > 0. (This is a state 
specification such that S is in a pure non-eigenstate of A at t1.) From COMP, we know that in 
state W (t1)  Pak S does not have value ak at t1, i.e.  [A] = ak at t1. But from the internal 
interpretation we know that p (ak) = p (ak (t1)) which is the probability that [A] = ak at t1. 
This probability is strictly positive, hence the theory producing it should be compatible with 
[A] = ak at t1 – which complete QM evidently is not (given the state specification in 
question). Contradiction. It would not be correct to say that the internal interpretation 
contradicts COMP. In fact, the correct thing to say is that complete QM (including a trivially 
admissible state specification) plus the internal interpretation contradicts the probability 
principle. I trust that the reader finds this principle as fundamental as I do. So, the internal 
interpretation is untenable in complete QM.6  
3.3 The external interpretation 
There is only one tangible alternative and hence only one conclusion to be drawn. Since the 
internal interpretation is in conflict with complete QM we must employ the external 
interpretation to make sense of it. 
We must consider (briefly) the following idea. Assuming that the time-parameter, in the 
external interpretation, refers to the probability for an event (not the event itself) we might 
still be free to assume that the parameter also refers to the event. Explicitly, the probability 
calculated from the trace formula, given a state W (t1), might be p (t1) (ak (t1)). Obviously, 
this is not a helpful idea because we now have a strictly positive probability at t1 for  
S having ak at t1, i.e. for [A] = ak at t1. But we also still have, from W (t1)  Pak (t1) and COMP, 
that S does not have value ak at t1, i.e.  [A] = ak at t1. So, there still is a contradiction with 
our probability principle. The only way out is to assume that the time-parameter (here its 
value t1), which, given the external interpretation, the probability inherits from the state 
W (t1), does not also refer to the event for whose realization the probability is given. What it 
does refer to is only the probability itself.  
However, we know from Time Parameter Uniqueness that QM contains just one  
parameter t. If it is not this parameter whose values are time-references for the predicted 
events in the trace formula, then these events can carry no time-references, at all. Hence, the 
expression ‘ak’ in the formula ‘p (t) (ak) = Tr (W (t) Pak)’ is necessarily timeless in complete 
QM. Note also the following fact. The trace formula can be suitably generalised to 
encompass discrete and continuous observables. The relevant counterpart of proposition 
‘[A] = ak’ in that generalised form must of course also be timeless to match the discrete case. 
But then this must also hold for the continuous case, i.e. for a continuous observable A, a 
value a and an arbitrary Borel subset B of the real line it must be the case that:  
 p (t) (a  B) = Tr (W (t) PA (B)) (3.1) 
where the proposition ‘a  B’ is necessarily timeless.  
                                                                 
6 See Held (2008, sec.s 2 and 3) for an earlier version of this argument. 
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Serious problems ensue. Familiar interpretations of QM notions cannot be maintained and 
important applications collapse. E.g., the so-called conventional interpretation of the wave-
function turns out to be false in complete QM. However, modern approaches to QM gravity 
(reasonably) construct probabilities for spacetime events that have this interpretation as a 
limiting case, so these approaches are also endangered. Similarly, QM transition 
probabilities and propagators cannot be defined in their usual textbook ways.7 These 
problems should convince us right away that the external interpretation is not the one we 
use in real-life QM. Of course, the factual practice of QM does not constitute a knock-down 
objection in matters foundational but indeed such an objection is comparatively easy to 
come by. We can, with standard QM techniques, construct probabilities that carry an explicit 
internal time-reference – despite the fact that complete QM now forbids it.  
The idea is as follows. In eq. (3.1) set A = X (the observable position), a = x and B = Δx   
(a value and value range of X). Proposition ‘x  Δx’ cannot carry the index t. And as in the 
discrete case this entails that the proposition cannot carry an index at all. Instead, the 
probability itself is time-indexed, i.e. we have another instance of the external 
interpretation: 
p (x  Δx) = p (t) (x  Δx). 
Consider now an observable that is a function of position, e.g. S’s potential energy V (x) 
and assume it to be explicitly time-dependent, i.e. V (x, t). (Since the Hamiltonian H is  
a function of V, it is here that we use the possibility that H = H (t).) Since V is a function of 
position (we can measure it via position measurements), we can exploit the Statistical 
Functional Composition Principle (a direct consequence of the trace formula; see Redhead 
1987, 18) to construct probabilities for values V of V (x, t) and equate them with those for 
position:  
p (V  ΔV (t)) = p (x  Δx)   
(where ΔV (t) is time-dependent because V (x, t) is). The values V of V (x, t) on the left are 
manifestly time-dependent.8 We thus have constructed a probability that explicitly has an 
internal time-reference and identified it with one that, given the external interpretation 
tailored to complete QM, cannot have such an internal time-reference. Contradiction, 
again. 
So the external interpretation of the trace formula cannot be correct, either. We need time-
references for the events predicted by the trace formula to do sensible QM. But the internal 
interpretation was so easily brought into a conflict with complete QM that it seems 
implausible to maintain. So in the presence of COMP, neither interpretation is tenable and 
there is no obvious third possibility. The argument, at this point, is inescapably turning 
against COMP. But COMP is our best (at any rate, most generally accepted) shot at how to 
interpret the KS no-hidden variables results. So we should very thoroughly look at possible 
objections. In the next section, I will consider whether the argument is a variant of the 
infamous measurement problem or otherwise trades on a neglect of the notion of QM 
measurement. Neither will turn out to be the case. I will then look at the only clear objection 
to the argument.  
                                                                 
7 Both these claims are substantiated in a companion paper (Held, in preparation).  
8 Details of the construction are again given in Held (in preparation). 
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4. Measurement 
4.1 The measurement problem 
An obvious intuition about the previous argument is that it constitutes just a peculiar form 
of the measurement problem and it is old wisdom that any interpretation of QM endorsing 
COMP must try to deal with that difficulty. But only the second half of this intuition is 
correct, not the first. Indeed it is true that a formulation of the measurement problem, in 
general, presupposes COMP. Let me quickly recall this.  
For simplicity, assume that observable A on S has just two distinct eigenvalues a1 and a2.  
Let S be measured by an A-measurement apparatus M and let [t1, t3] be an interval such that 
t1 is the time of measurement onset and t3 some later time. Assume that S is in a 
superposition of A-eigenstates, e.g. in Pb (t1) = | b > < b | where | b > = 1/2 (| a1 > + | a2 >). 
First, assume that from our observation of a suitable pointer observable M on M we learn 
that [M] = m1 at t3. From this we want to conclude something about S’s value of A,  
e.g. [A] = a1 at t2 – where t2 is an arbitrary time from [t1, t3], including the boundaries. 
All choices of t2 are perfectly possible. In particular, it is consistent to assume jointly that S is 
in Pb (t1) (a projector onto a non-eigenstate of A) and [A] = a1 at t1. Similarly, if S is in Pb (t2), 
where t2 is an arbitrary time with t2  ]t1, t3], (S stays in the superposition due to unitary 
time evolution) we can consistently assume [A] = a1 at t2. Now, assume also EE plus State 
Uniqueness (from sec.2.1) or alternatively COMP. Then on pain of contradiction, we can 
assume jointly neither Pb (t1) and [A] = a1 at t1 nor Pb (t2) and [A] = a1 at t2. We can no longer 
draw any conclusions from our assumed observation [M] = m1 at t3 to S – which is what 
generally a measurement of S by means of M is intended to deliver. 
In its more familiar form, the measurement problem refers not to conclusions from observed 
pointer values to S values but instead to the QM state of the apparatus M. Let an  
A-measurement on S by M be modelled in the combined system S + M by initial states  
PRi (t1) = | Ri > < Ri |, where | Ri > = | ai >| mready > and final states PAi (t2) = | Ai > < Ai |, 
where | Ai > = | ai >| mi >, for i = 1,2, and where t2  ]t1, t3]. Then, if S + M is in state  
PR (t1) = | R > < R |, where | R > = | b >| mready > and | b > as before, it follows that S + M 
is in state PB (t2) = | B > < B | with | B > = 1/2 (| a1 >| m1 > + | a2 >| m2 >). Again, it is 
perfectly consistent to assume that S + M is in PB (t2) and [M] = m1 at t2 (or alternatively  
[M] = m1 at t2). Now, assume EE in the form: [M] = mi at t if and only if S is in Pmi (t) (for i = 1,2) 
plus again State Uniqueness. Then, again on pain of contradiction, we can assume jointly 
neither PB (t2) and [M] = m1 at t2 nor PB (t2) and [M] = m2 at t2 for any t2  ]t1, t3]. The 
apparatus has been pushed into a QM state such that, given EE, it is impossible to assume it 
as showing one of the pointer values – in contradiction with what we really observe. (As is 
well-known, COMP here is too weak to generate the contradiction because M’s state at t2 is a 
reduction mixture. As is also well-known, moving from EE to COMP alone does not suffice 
to avoid the measurement problem since the M reduction mixture cannot be given an 
ignorance interpretation.) 
So, the measurement problem confronts QM states and hypothetical observations by means 
of EE plus State Uniqueness or COMP – which means that it presupposes EE or COMP. The 
argument of sec.3 is not a form of the measurement problem simply because it does not 
mention any observations at all that could be confronted with QM states. On the other hand, 
the measurement problem requires COMP or the stronger EE for its formulation. And the 
argument of sec.3 shows that COMP is incompatible with QM, even without that 
confrontation. If sound the argument provides grounds to reject the measurement problem 
www.intechopen.com
 
The Quantum Completeness Problem 183 
because it rests on a combination of COMP (or EE) and QM, which is in a deeper sense 
incoherent, i.e. leads to a consistency problem without invoking observations (though using 
other assumptions).  
4.2 The value assumption 
Now, while the previous argument cannot be said to be a version of the measurement 
problem one may still think that it unduly neglects the crucial role of measurement in QM.  
I will try to dispel this impression. Evidently, the argument has not mentioned 
measurement. This would be inevitable if the two readings of the trace formula were 
integrated into a full axiom system for QM. Such a system would contain a statistical 
algorithm and that algorithm would be (or directly entail) one for generating probabilities 
via the trace formula. In formulating the latter algorithm – the Born Rule – we would have 
to take a stand on the notion of measurement. Generally, measurements and outcomes are 
mentioned explicitly and many think that this is an unavoidable feature of the Born Rule.9 
But considering the appropriate wording of the Born Rule here would just needlessly 
complicate the argument – which requires nothing but the trace formula itself.10 
Let me however explicate an assumption that has tacitly been made in the argument (and 
will be tentatively questioned below, in sec.5). Recall that in the trace formula I took p (ak) to 
be the probability for [A] = ak, i.e. explicitly for ‘S has value ak of A’. The argument in sec.3.2 
would not get off the ground if p (ak) were not this probability for [A] = ak, because the 
conflict arises between p (ak) > 0 (from the trace formula and an admissible state 
specification) and  [A] = ak (from COMP). The conflict becomes sharp, if both statements 
are nailed to the same time and we assume that p (F) > 0 entails that F can consistently be 
added as an assumption (our probability principle). But even then a contradiction will only 
arise if in ‘p (ak)’ the “inner” expression ‘ak’ really means ‘S has value ak of A’. If that is not 
the case then even fixing the same time for both propositions will not generate any problem. 
So the assumption at work in the previous argument is that in the trace formula: 
p (ak) = p ([A] = ak), 
i.e. p (ak) is the probability that S has value ak of A.  
This very elementary assumption may be called the value assumption because it amounts to 
the claim that the events concerning S, for which QM encodes probabilities, are simply 
identical to S having a value of an observable. Note carefully that this assumption does not 
involve a claim about when S eventually has value ak of A and hence is not per se in a 
conflict with certain widespread intuitions about QM probabilities. Instead it helps to 
disentangle these intuitions – because we can separate the question of what the QM events 
(“inside” the probability of the trace formula) are from the one when they eventually occur.  
I will consider three intuitions about measurement. First, there is the intuition that QM 
probabilities concern events that are conditional upon measurement. We can implement this in 
QM in different ways. First of all, we can write the following version of the Born Rule:  
If S is in state W (t) and A is an observable on S and if an A-measurement on S is made then: 
p (ak) = Tr (W (t) Pak). Here measurement is mentioned as one of several conditions for the 
                                                                 
9 Among many possible references see Redhead (1987, 8), Hughes (1989, 70), van Fraassen (1991, 142-
143), Albert (1992, 35), Bub (1999, 31), Nielsen & Chuang (2000, 84-85), Landsman (2009, 66). 
10 In this sense, the version of the argument of sec.3.2 given in Held (2008) is inferior to the present one.  
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trace formula which itself remains formally untouched. In particular, no reason emerges for 
assuming that the event for which a probability (given the conditions) is encoded should not 
be just that S has value ak of A. Alternatively, we could insist that this special condition be 
directly written into the trace formula itself. Now, it is well-known that if conditional 
probabilities are introduced via the familiar Kolmogorov definition, then a conditional 
probability p (ak | MA), where MA is the “event” of an A-measurement being initiated, is not 
generally well-defined.11 Suppose nevertheless, for a moment, that QM probabilities were 
simple conditional probabilities. Again, the value assumption could stay essentially 
unaffected. Probability p (ak) would now equal p (ak | MA) but in that latter expression the 
component ‘ak’ could keep its meaning. If, on independent grounds we can manage to nail 
the ‘ak’ in p (ak | MA) to the same time t, for which an A-value is prohibited via COMP, the 
conflict is just the same as before. Finally, consider p (ak given MA), where ‘given’ is a 
conditional connective awaiting further analysis.12 The situation will still be the same. 
Appreciating that QM probabilities are conditional on measurement will not in itself 
contradict the assumption that the conditioned events just consist in S having a value of an 
observable. All in all, conditioning on measurement is not in itself, in conflict with the value 
assumption. 
Second, there is a strong intuition that, because QM probabilities are conditional on 
measurement, the events they concern are measurement outcomes. What is the consequence 
of this? Again, nothing in itself prohibits that a measurement outcome be reported in the 
statement ‘S has value ak of A’. Indeed, it is not entirely implausible to assume that a 
measurement outcome just is a value possessed (at some time) conditional on a 
measurement (at an earlier time). So, we can call the events in question by the name of 
outcomes and still respect the value assumption. Admittedly, the notion of an outcome is 
ambiguous enough to be interpreted, alternatively, as not meaning a possessed value but 
something else. This ambiguity, however, should tell against a use of “outcome” in the 
foundations of QM without clarifying whether or not an outcome is a (perhaps 
conditionally) possessed value of S or not. 
Finally, it is sometimes said that QM systems upon measurement display or show values of 
observables13 and hence QM probabilities should be interpreted as concerning such 
displaying or showing events. Since displaying or showing something is representing 
something, this is just a terribly misplaced metaphor. But even if we take QM systems as 
representing something upon measurement, there still are only two options. Does S have or 
possess what it represents (or displays or shows) upon measurement? If so the value 
assumption is met, if no it isn’t. Again, the idea in itself is ambiguous enough to be 
interpreted in a sense that is not in conflict with that assumption.   
Before moving on I describe a simple non-QM example where all three intuitions plus the 
value assumption are respected. Our present picture of QM measurement may be described 
by using the following analogy. Such measurement is not like opening a box and 
determining the colour of the ball inside. Instead, it is like rolling a die and recording the 
result. Consider this latter picture. Assume that we have a fair die and want to define 
probabilities for the experiment of rolling it. We understand that the type of event, for which 
we define probabilities, is that the die shows a certain one of its six faces at the end of the 
                                                                 
11 See van Fraassen and Hooker (1976), 229. 
12 See Halpin (1991), Butterfield (1993), Held (2008, sec.5) for more on the appropriate analysis. 
13 See Earman’s portrayal of a ‘non-realist’ interpretation of QM measurement in Earman (1986), 219. 
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experiment. The probability p (6) = 1/6 is directly understood as being the probability at the 
start of the experiment and as being conditional upon actually rolling the die. If measuring 
what the die shows is indeed doing the experiment of rolling it then, if the die in the end 
shows 6, that event is indeed conditional upon measurement. That event is also naturally 
described as the experiment’s outcome and the die can meaningfully be said to display or 
show the number 6. Yet, there can be no doubt that the die in the end also has the value 6 (of 
the observable ‘which face is up’). It would be confused here to assume that outcomes are 
not possessed values. Yes, they are but they are not values possessed initially – in contrast 
with what we assume about the ball in the box. The whole burden of distinguishing the die 
“measurement” from the “classical” colour measurement in the ball is carried by implicit 
time-references. In particular, in the case of the die p (6) = 1/6 is the measurement outcome 
probability at the beginning of the experiment and the eventual outcome 6 is an event at its 
end. Accordingly, I now turn to a school of thought about QM measurement where 
probability and QM event refer to different times but the value assumption is respected.  
I will not try to be exhaustive but only consider two prominent authors representing that 
school, one a founding father of QM (von Neumann), the other a leading contemporary 
interpreter (van Fraassen).  
4.3 Von Neumann’s account 
As has been pointed out many times before, Dirac and von Neumann can be credited with 
having first assumed EE – even if only implicitly.14 In von Neumann’s formulation of the 
Born Rule the key expression is that, given a state W and an observable A, p ([A] = ak) 
(or equivalently p ([Pak] = 1) is the probability that A (or Pak) ‘takes on’ a value ak (or 1) (see 
von Neumann 1932/1955, 200, 206, 211). There is only one sentence, however, where he 
explicitly says that the Born Rule ‘does not tell us what values [the observables] have in the 
state W, but only with what probability they take on all possible values’ (ibid., 206; my italics 
and notation). (In passing, I note that von Neumann does not explicitly claim this taking-on 
to be conditional on measurement.) Only here we explicitly learn that ‘taking on’ a value is 
opposed to ‘having’ it, i.e. that ‘taking on’ is a dynamical process.15 By a dynamical process 
I mean a transition in time from S having no value of A to having one of the ai – which 
(since von Neumann accepts EE) simultaneously is a transition from W  Pai (for any i) to Pai 
(for some i): the famous “collapse of the wave-function”. As that latter expression suggests, 
the transition is construed best as taking place instantaneously; at any rate, this is the 
standard understanding. 
What are we to say about this instantaneous transition? Suppose, quite unreasonably, that it 
is instantaneous in the sense of taking up no interval of time, at all. Because of Time 
Reference (also explicitly endorsed by von Neumann; see 1932/1955, 198) W = W (t). Now, 
are we to think that the transition is from W (t)  Pai (for any i) to Pai (for some i), where  
Pai = Pai (t)? Given State Uniqueness, this is contradictory. So this interpretation is 
implausible. Suppose, more reasonably, that the transition is instantaneous in the sense of 
                                                                 
14 See note 3 above. 
15 The other two passages are ambiguous. Suppose that for a function F (t) of parameter t, a real number 
f and value t1 of t, F (t1) = f. One might describe this by saying that F takes on value f at t1. But of course F 
can simultaneously be said to have value f at t1. Accordingly, the taking-on here is not a dynamical 
process. This interpretation, though implausible in a physics context, is at least possible for the passages 
on p. 200 and p. 211.  
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taking up an infinitesimal interval dt – where, as usual, “infinitesimal” means arbitrarily 
small but finite. Then the instantaneous transition can be viewed as being one from W (t) to 
Pai (t + dt) (for some i) and from S having no value of A at t to having one of the ai at t + dt – 
a perfectly consistent interpretation of von Neumann’s idea. But notice that [t, t +dt] though 
arbitrarily small is finite and cannot go to zero (on pain of reproducing the previous 
contradiction).  
Now, should von Neumann be interpreted as proposing a version of the Born Rule for 
transitions or for the values possessed at the end of such transitions? Naively, it seems 
legitimate to equate a probability for S taking on a value of A in the interval [t, t +dt] as the 
probability for S having that value of A at t + dt but is this interpretation admissible here? 
Indeed, it is not only legitimate but a necessity. Clearly, if W (t) = Pak , then p ([Pak] = 1 at  
t + dt) cannot be the probability for S taking on ak within [t, t +dt] for that would entail that 
at t S does not have ak at t – which contradicts EE. But Generality requires that we give the 
trace formula a uniform interpretation (either transitions or possessed values) for all states. 
Hence, it must be possessed values. One must interpret von Neumann’s Born probabilities 
as being for the events of S having that value of A at t + dt.16 This is to say that von Neumann 
must endorse the value assumption.17 Moreover, he must endorse the following version of 
the trace formula: 
 p ([Pak] = 1 at t + dt) = Tr (W(t) Pak) (4.1) 
(where p ([Pak] = 1 at t + dt) = p([A] = ak at t + dt). But why should an interpreter propose 
this? For an answer, I can only refer back to sec. 3.2. Von Neumann endorses COMP 
(because he assumes EE and certainly endorses State Uniqueness). In the presence of COMP, 
p ([Pak] = 1 at t) = Tr (W(t) Pak) looks implausible (for W(t)  Pai, for any i) and indeed, given 
the probability principle, does yield a contradiction. It is just natural to avoid the threat of 
that contradiction by forcing apart time references for state and possible value.  
However, against this line of thought the second part of the above argument (sec.3.3) now is 
seen to have bite. If (4.1) is the proposed explication of the trace formula for a state W (t) and 
observable Pak then this proposal is in trouble. Obviously, a value of the time-reference  
t + dt on the left cannot come from W (t) because t and t + dt are supposed to take different 
values while the size of dt is nowhere determined. (Recall that the infinitesimal size of dt 
                                                                 
16 Explicitly, the argument is this. Assume that p (T (ai)) = Tr (W(t) Pai) where T (ai) is the transition from 
S not having ai at t to S having ai at t +dt (for all i). Presupposing Generality, assume W (t) = Pak (t). 
Hence, S is in the eigenstate pertaining to ak at t. Then by EE, S has ak at t. But the p (T (ai)) have just 
been defined as probabilities for transitions starting from S not having ai (for all i). Hence, S does not 
have any of the values ai at t and a fortiori not ak. Contradiction. In words: von Neumann’s Born 
probabilities cannot concern transitions from no value of A to value of A, in general, on pain of violating 
EE, when W projects onto an eigenstate of A.  
17 In fact, at a much later point von Neumann in a sense denies the value assumption when he writes: 
‘Indeed experience only makes statements of this type: an observer has made a certain (subjective) 
observation; and never any like this: a physical quantity has a certain value.’ (von Neumann 1932/1955, 
420). This idea is a denial of the value assumption if we assume that QM probabilities concern what we 
experience rather than what is the case. Note however that the present context is different because it 
speaks not of experience but of what is the case: von Neumann’s decree that the trace formula fixes 
‘with what probability [observables] take on … possible values’ (206) implies that such taking-on of a 
value can happen. If it does then, as a result, the observable has a value – regardless of whether an 
observer has a mere ‘(subjective) observation’ of that or more.  
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does absolutely no work here. The interval cannot be set to zero without reproducing the 
previous contradiction, so the limit of making dt ever smaller simply does not exist. But 
which time value then is t + dt ?) So there is nothing at all in QM to provide a value of  
t + dt on the left because (due to Time Parameter Uniqueness) there is no second time-
parameter in QM. Hence (4.1) cannot be a formula of QM. Instead the outcome [Pak] = 1 in 
(4.1) must lack a time-reference. And, as we saw in sec.3.3, this in turn can be shown to be 
incompatible with QM itself. 
4.4 Van Fraassen’s account 
A detailed discussion of QM measurement is presented in van Fraassen (1991).While this 
discussion is critical of von Neumann’s classical account, it is in one sense similar to the 
latter. Both are part of a school of thought that distributes state plus probability and 
eventual outcome to different times in order to make sense of QM measurement in light of 
COMP. Moreover, van Fraassen also respects the value assumption. I quote a longer 
passage, where he characterizes QM measurement before differentiating collapse and no-
collapse (modal) interpretations (one version of which he advocates). Van Fraassen writes: 
Born’s Rule says [… that the] probability that a measurement of yes-no observable P 
will yield value 1, if made in state W, equals Tr (W P). This statement gives us the 
probability of the occurrence of an event, conditional on the occurrence of a certain 
measurement process in a given state. […] But what is this event? During the 
measurement process we see an initial situation change into a final situation. The initial 
situation can be analysed into two parts: the system of interest is in state W, and the 
environment (presence of and interaction with the measuring apparatus in its 
groundstate) has a certain character – call it IN. In the final situation, this system’s state 
will have evolved into, say, W′, and the environment will have a new character – call it 
OUT – which includes e.g. that the pointer on the apparatus now sits at the number 1. So 
we have the transition: IN, W  W′, OUT. This transition could be indeterministic in two 
ways. Recall that we have a probability for OUT. Another possible transition – one that 
could have occurred but did not – may be described as IN, W  W′′, OUT′ and it too had 
a probability. (1991, 244-5; my italics)   
The two ways of indeterminism then differentiate two types of interpretation. Either, in a 
no-collapse interpretation, given ‘the initial situation (IN, W), the final state W′ is completely 
determined (so W′′ = W′), and the probability we are given is really the probability of 
character OUT, given that the system is then in state W′.’ Or, in a collapse interpretation, 
given ‘the final state, the outcome character is completely determined (OUT  OUT′ then  
W′  W′′), and the probability we are given is the probability of the transition from state W 
to W′, when the initial situation has character IN.’ (1991, 245). 
From this passage, we learn two things about QM measurement. First, although van 
Fraassen does not explicate time-references for W and W′ (or W′′) it is entirely obvious from 
(the italicised portions of) the text that W′ (or W′′) is the system’s state at a time later than the 
one of W. Second, it is also clear from the text that the Born Rule probability is one for an 
event at the later time: W′ and character OUT are both part of the ‘final situation’ and the 
original probability is either one for OUT only or for OUT plus W′. All in all, van Fraassen 
straightforwardly explains that in the trace formula p ([P] = 1) = Tr (W P) the elements ‘W’ 
(state) and ‘[P] = 1’ (value) refer to different times. In a collapse interpretation, this 
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probability simultaneously is one for W′ = P such that we can rewrite the formula as  
p (P) = Tr (W P). This of course implies the weaker formula. Moreover, since by assumption 
W′ is a state later than W, in this rewritten version the two time references are even more 
obvious.  
Explicitly, van Fraassen starts with W, the initial state of S (‘the system of interest’) as an 
input for the trace formula. Hence, he proposes a version of formula p ([Pak] = 1) = Tr (W 
Pak), where ‘W’ (initial state of S) and ‘[Pak] = 1’ (value of S) refer to different times. This is a 
literal interpretation of the passage and I emphasize right away that it is doubtful whether it 
really catches van Fraassen’s intention but leave that worry aside for a moment. What 
van Fraassen clearly does endorse is the value assumption. When expounding his own 
interpretation he takes the Born Rule to deliver probabilities for ‘value states’ or better for 
the truth of ‘value attributing propositions’ where such a proposition ‘says that observable 
A actually has a value ak’ (van Fraassen 1991, 275; my italics and notation). 
Assume now that in van Fraassen’s equation p ([Pak] = 1) = Tr (W Pak) the state W equals  
W (t1) where t1 is the time of the onset of interaction between S and M. This is clearly 
suggested by his characterizing W as the ‘initial state’. Assume that the second half of my 
interpretation is also correct, i.e. that ‘[Pak] = 1’ is an equivalent of his value attributing 
proposition which, if true, is true at a later time. Van Fraassen then is effectively putting 
forward this version of the trace formula:     
 p ([Pak] = 1 at t′) = Tr (W(t) Pak) (4.2) 
where t′ > t. But of course, the problem with (4.2) is the same as with von Neumann’s (4.1). 
QM contains no theory giving us t′ for a given t, so (4.2) cannot be a formula of QM. This 
means that also in van Fraassen’s version of the trace formula the internal time-reference 
must be cancelled as a matter of principle – which in sec. 3.3 was shown to be in conflict 
with QM.  
I have recorded doubts whether van Fraassen should be saddled with the interpretation 
leading to (4.2).18 Indeed, it is very clear that his account of measurement aims at another 
state. To quote him again, in a no-collapse interpretation the trace formula provides ‘the 
probability of character OUT, given that the system is then in state W′.’ We may read this as 
saying that really W′ (t2) of S is the appropriate input for the formula. This reading is 
corroborated by looking at van Fraassen’s own version of a no-collapse interpretation. 
Referring back to my discussion of a superposition measurement in sec.4.1, the 
interpretation holds that the state of composite system S + M at t2 equals PB′ (t2) = 
| B′ > < B′ | with | B′ > = 1/2 (| a1 >| m1 > + | a2 >| m2 >). At t2, S and M have become 
correlated, their reduced states are mixtures and denial of EE allows us to ascribe values to 
                                                                 
18 I here refer to van Fraassen (1991). In an earlier exposition of his modal interpretation van Fraassen 
formulates an equivalent of (4.2) explicitly. He gives this version of the Born Rule: ‘When A is an 
observable pertaining to S and the process w (t1)  w (t2) is a measurement of A on S by M, with pointer 
observable M, then 1 (t1) (<A, E>) is the probability that w (t2) is in < A, E> and equally the probability 
that it is in < M, E>’ (van Fraassen 1981, 305; notation adapted). Van Fraassen’s ‘S is in < A, E>’ is 
equivalent to ‘[A]  E’ and for discrete A may be simplified to ‘[A] = ak’ or equivalently ‘[Pak] = 1’.  is a 
map from the set of value attributions into [0, 1] given by  (<A, E>) = Tr (PM, E), where  is a density 
operator, i.e. in the present notation we can introduce a similar map W with: W ([Pak] = 1) = Tr (W Pak). 
Putting in time references from the quotation, we get p ([Pak] = 1 at t2) = Tr (W(t1) Pak) – which is an 
instance of (4.2).  
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observables A and M (on S and M). This again seems to imply that it is a state W′ (t2) (e.g. a 
reduced state of S) that should go into the trace formula – at least in a no-collapse 
interpretation. (Note that for a collapse interpretation using W′ (t2), a collapsed state as an 
input for the formula would not, generally make sense.)  
Van Fraassen’s exposition only suggests this alternative interpretation but another 
interpreter, Vermaas (1999, 195), explicates it – for a certain type of state W′ (t2).19 Vermaas 
also endorses a no-collapse interpretation and is motivated by a similar account of 
measurement. He uses W′ (t2), where this is the reduced state of the apparatus M, in order to 
calculate probabilities for values of the pointer observable M or explicitly: p ([P] = 1 at t2) = 
Tr (W′ (t2) P) (where P now is a projector onto an eigenspace of M).20 Apparently, it seems 
unobjectionable in this particular situation to write the trace formula like this. But of course the 
formula cannot plausibly be restricted to this situation. We cannot help ourselves to a version 
here which we are not obliged to in general. When we consider possible interpretations of the 
trace formula any restriction to a certain type of state (apparatus mixture) is illegitimate. 
Neither the formula nor any standard version of the Born Rule (where it ultimately resides) 
nor the algorithm for expectation values know of any such restriction. And it is this fact that 
has led me to explicitly claim Generality of the trace formula as a property of QM. Now, if we 
read Vermaas’ version as a general proposal for interpreting the trace formula then clearly we 
are back to square one. We must allow W (t1) as a possible input for the formula, where W (t1) 
is S’s state at an arbitrary time (it might be measurement onset or not). According to the 
proposal Vermaas makes (using W′ (t2)!), we then have, for (the equally admissible) W (t1), 
the formula p ([Pak] = 1 at t1) = Tr (W (t1) Pak). But this just is the internal interpretation of the 
formula from sec.3.2. If W (t1) is a superposition of A-eigenstates this interpretation is 
straightforwardly brought into conflict with COMP.  
One may question whether I am doing justice to the proposal. What is intended is a version 
of the trace formula: p ([P] = 1 at t2) = Tr (W′ (t2) P), where W′ (t2) is an arbitrary state in the 
sense of pertaining either to S, M or S + M, but a non-arbitrary one in the sense of referring 
to a time t2 after measurement onset. By contrast, W (t1) does not unambiguously refer to such 
a time, indeed can be taken to be the state at measurement onset. So the idea is to formulate 
a version of the trace formula roughly like this: 
 p ([Pak] = 1 at t2) = Tr (W′ (t2) Pak) (4.3) 
where W′ (t2) explicitly is considered as a state after measurement onset. Taking t1 to be 
measurement onset, W (t1) is not a legitimate input for (4.2). I understand the idea but still 
cannot see how it respects the QM property of Generality. At an arbitrary time t, the 
system’s state is represented by an arbitrary member W (t) of the set of all possible density 
operators on the appropriate space and the trace formula processes that state. So to respect 
Generality, W (t1) has to be an admissible input. 
One may propose that Generality should be relinquished. I have two replies. First of all, I 
insist that Generality is a feature of ordinary QM. No version of the trace formula known to 
me makes any restrictions on the allowed input states and observables.21 KS type theorems 
                                                                 
19 Vermaas here characterizes a common property of three modal interpretations that are all stronger 
than van Fraassen’s (see Vermaas 1999, ch.4), so we may take his proposal as an interpretation of the 
trace formula in modal interpretations, in general. 
20 This explicitly is the content of Vermaas’ proposal (1999, 195). 
21 In particular, this is true for the references in note 9 above. 
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concern observables in ordinary QM, COMP was intended as an interpretation of these 
theorems referring to ordinary QM, and it is ordinary QM that has been shown to be in a 
conflict with COMP. So the proposal to relinquish Generality amounts to a change of the 
subject because it does not talk about ordinary QM.  
Second, I do not see how (4.3) really could work. Since Generality is a formal property of 
QM, to abandon it means to substantially revise the formalism and it is not a priori clear 
whether the revision will give us a sensible new QM. Consider this. Regardless of whether 
we interpret W′ (t2) in (4.3) as a state of S, M or S + M, it is a state at some time during (or at 
the end of) an A-measurement, hence is not independent of a choice of observable A. 
Accordingly, the trace formula is no longer general in yet another sense, i.e. it no longer 
processes arbitrary observables. Suppose that we want to calculate W′ (t2) via the QM time-
evolution directly from the preparation W (t0) – insisting with (4.2) that an A-measurement 
must start at some time t1 in between, but not specifying a state W (t1) – then W (t0) has to 
include some state of the A-measurement apparatus leading to the appropriate ‘ready’-state, 
i.e. we would no longer be able to refer to states of QM systems apart from devices 
measuring specific observables on them. Suppose alternatively that we want to recover 
something like Generality, given (4.3). Assume that, for observables A and B with [A, B]  0, 
we want the trace formula to yield probabilities for both choices. This inevitably will force 
that we do explicate a state W (t1) of S alone (calculated from W (t0) and with t0 < t1 < t2) that 
is neutral between those choices. So the algorithm containing the new trace formula (4.3)  
(a new version of the Born Rule) will have to make reference to two different states W (t1) 
and W′ (t2). And this will have to involve an exact theory about how the two states are 
related, i.e. given W (t1), where t1 may be measurement onset, we must name sufficient 
conditions for how to pick time t2 such that W′ (t2) can be put into the trace formula. The 
usual choice – that t2 is a time when S and M have become perfectly correlated (see van 
Fraassen 1991, 200) – is unavailable because that correlation presupposes an apparatus 
measuring a specific observable, mention of which we just wanted to avoid. 
In sum, (4.3) simply does not respect one of the properties of QM, i.e. Generality. Giving up 
this property forces a formidable revision of QM that does not yet exist. I don’t think that 
modal interpreters like van Fraassen or Vermaas really intend such a revision. But the only 
alternative to (4.3) is the literal interpretation of van Fraassen’s general account of 
measurement – in effect (4.2). The argument of sec.3.2 can be viewed as explaining why 
interpreters put forward proposals like this. (Van Fraassen, though exceptionally clear on 
the matter, certainly is not the only interpreter doing so; vide von Neumann.) And sec.3.3 
above presents an argument why (4.2), like (4.1) before, cannot be a component of QM. All 
in all, both van Fraassen and von Neumann exemplify an important tradition of thought 
about QM measurement that as a whole is challenged by the above argument. Our 
consideration of this tradition, rather than showing how to avoid or mitigate the original 
completeness problem, exposes it even more starkly.  
5. Objection 
The mentioned school of thought about QM measurement tries to accommodate COMP by 
accepting the value assumption and suggesting two time references, either by separating the 
time references of state and eventual value ((4.1 and (4.2)) or by tacitly referring to a state at 
a time after measurement onset ((4.3)). Both roads, I have argued, are blocked. So we should 
now consider the remaining alternative. Could the value assumption be dropped?  
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This is a fundamental objection and it makes the whole argument of sec.3.2 collapse 
immediately. To repeat: Given the value assumption, in the trace formula p (ak) = p ([A] = ak) 
where ‘[A] = ak’ means that S has value ak of A. Now, choose W (t) such that p (ak) > 0 and, 
by COMP, [A] = ak at t. Setting p (ak) = p (ak (t)) we get an implausibility and, assuming 
the probability principle, a contradiction. It all depends on the first step: the value 
assumption. To drop it means to assume that QM probabilities do not concern events that 
can be identified with S having a value (of an observable) at a specific time. Instead they 
concern events of another type – but events that can be assumed to occur at time t, where t is 
the parameter from W (t).  
We can very broadly delimit what these events are. The purpose of giving up the value 
assumption is to find a replacement for ‘[A] = ak at t’ in p ([A] = ak at t) such that the latter 
does not (via the probability principle) get into conflict with [A] = ak at t, from COMP 
(given a pure non-eigenstate of A). A positive suggestion for the events is that they are 
situations which are as if [A] = ak at t. Let’s write p (“[A] = ak at t”) – using double quotes – 
for the probability that the situation at t is as if S had ak at t. In fact, this is the broadest 
construal of an alternative to p ([A] = ak at t) – no double quotes – that I can think of. Its 
appeal, I believe, comes from the following intuition. A physical situation can have features 
that are as if some fact F were the case while in fact it must, for whatever reason, remain open 
whether really F is the case.22 Think, e.g., of a concrete reading of a value of pointer 
observable M from which we draw conclusions to S values (perhaps at the same or perhaps 
at an earlier time). Isn’t the whole situation at the end of a measurement as if S had ak  
(at some time, leave that open for the moment)? And isn’t it plausible that one can remain 
agnostic whether S really had ak (at that time)? 
This interpretation of the ‘as if’-proposal may be appealing but here it is not available. Recall 
once more the structure of the argument in sec.3.2 and plug in the ‘as if’-proposal. Choose 
W (t) such that p (“[A] = ak at t”) > 0 and, by COMP, [A] = ak at t. Since the probability is 
positive the probability principle applies, i.e. the proposition “within” the probability must 
be consistent with [A] = ak at t. For a check, resolve the double quotes of that proposition 
in the manner suggested: ‘It is as if [A] = ak at t but in fact it remains open whether [A] = ak at t’. 
Clearly this sentence does not safely avoid a contradiction with ‘[A] = ak at t’. So the 
appealing version of the ‘as if’-interpretation is not the one that can salvage the consistency 
of complete QM. Instead what we need is that propositions of type “[A] = ak at t” (with 
double quotes) are interpreted as follows: ‘It is as if [A] = ak at t but in fact  
it is not the case that [A] = ak at t’. This statement is the only explication safely consistent with 
‘[A] = ak at t’ and hence is the only available reading of the ‘as if’-interpretation. But now 
recall that the proposal must be taken as an alternative reading of all probabilities within the 
trace formula. So, if we adopt the ‘as if’-proposal we automatically propose what QM 
probabilities are, in general. Such probabilities now concern the mere display of values. (For 
contrast, recall the display of number 6 in the die in sec.4.2). Writing the display of a value 
                                                                 
22 This also is a plausible interpretation of von Neumann’s idea that in a QM context experience only 
consists in statements of ‘(subjective) observation’, not statements ascertaining what is the case (see note 
17). I have argued above that in the context of his ‘taking on’-idea probabilities must concern what is the 
case, hence the value assumption must be respected. Here, I explore the idea that probabilities do 
concern only what we experience, not what is the case, i.e. that the value assumption is rejected. I do not 
think that von Neumann can coherently maintain both his ideas but I will not try to show this as it 
would embroil me in questions of text exegesis.  
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in French quotes, we have that “ai”  « ai » & ai. We have that an ‘as if’-probability  
p (“ai”) equals p (« ai » & ai) (for all i).  
As an interpretation of a fundamental physical theory this sounds wildly implausible and it 
can indeed be shown to be so. Consider what can be the only motivation for the proposal: to 
harmonize QM and completeness in the form of either EE or COMP. So the proposal had 
better be compatible with these two assumptions. But it cannot be so if it also respects 
Generality, i.e. is a state-independent version of the trace formula. Assume that the formula 
is now to be read as: 
 p (“[A] = ak at t”) = Tr (W (t) Pak) (5.1) 
for arbitrary W (t) and A. Now, suppose that W (t) = Pak. Then, from (5.1)  
p (“ak (t)”) = 1. But this equals the following probability: p (« ak (t) » & ak(t)). Since the 
probability of this conjunction equals 1 we may assume that both conjuncts are true. In 
particular it is true that  [A] = ak at t. We have deduced: If S is in W (t) = Pak then [A] = ak 
at t. This contradicts EE, so a defender of full EE cannot maintain (5.1) for all states. 
Given COMP, there is no contradiction but still we have deduced that if S is in W (t) = Pak 
then [A] = ak at t. Since A is arbitrary and k is an arbitrary one of the indices i, we have 
derived that if S is in an arbitrary A-eigenstate then it does not have a value of A. But 
recalling COMP, when S is in an A-eigenstate then it does not have a value of B, for any B 
with [A, B]  0. So when S is in an arbitrary pure state, it does not have a value of any 
observable. This is an implausible result. We should recall why COMP was endorsed in the 
first place, namely to accommodate the classical no hidden variables proofs (of KS-type). 
These proofs show that (given two assumptions) observables on S forming a KS set cannot 
all be assumed to simultaneously have values. Now, we learn that given S’s state is pure, 
none of the observables in an arbitrary set has a value anyway (at a given time). So, given a 
pure state the claims of all KS-type proofs are vacuously true. Now, if S’s state is an 
ignorance mixture then S really is in one of the pure states we happen to be ignorant about, 
so assuming S’s state to be such a mixture will not make a difference. So the defender of (5.1) 
and COMP must claim that only if S is in a mixture not interpretable as an expression of our 
ignorance, i.e. a reduction mixture, it can be assumed to have a value of some observable and 
the KS arguments are non-vacuously true. However, it is perfectly admissible to assume S – 
say, Kochen and Specker’s original spin-1 system – to be the only QM system in the 
universe. In this case, there is no larger system such that S’s reduced state could be 
interpreted as a non-trivial reduction mixture – which again means that the KS arguments 
are only vacuously true. Hence, this line of reasoning is implausible. Accordingly, the ‘as if’-
interpretation cannot deliver a version of the trace formula that is plausible and respects 
Generality.  
As in the case of proposal (4.3), one may seriously consider giving up Generality. Again, this 
means to give up something that is a property of ordinary QM. Abandoning it may be a 
possible reaction to the argument (which concerns ordinary QM) but certainly is no valid 
objection. And again the price of abandoning Generality is high. It is a formal property of 
QM, hence without it we must revise the formalism. Neither has such a revision been tried 
anywhere nor is it obvious how a reasonable new QM could arise. Suppose that we bite the 
bullet and dismiss the project of one general trace formula. We would have two trace 
formulas instead:  
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 p (“[A] = ak at t”) = Tr (W (t) Pak),    if   W (t)  Pai, for any i; W (t) pure (5.2a) 
 p ([A] = ak at t) = Tr (W (t) Pak)    if    W (t) = Pai, for any i (5.2b) 
According to (5.2b), for the eigenstates of A we have p (ak (t)) = ik for W (t) = Pai. And by 
(5.2a), p (“ak (t)”) is the appropriate probability for a pure non-eigenstate of A. How to treat 
mixed states? Assume first that they are lumped together with the Pai in (5.2b), i.e. the trace 
formula produces probabilities for the truly possessed values for these mixtures (rather then 
the ‘as if’-probabilities of (5.2a)). It seems plausible that for an observable A  B on a 
compound system the ‘as if’-interpretation (5.2a) is true with respect to A  B if and only if 
it is true for A and B Now, let S + M be in state PB = | B > < B | with  
| B > = ½ (3) | a1 >| m1 > + ½ | a2 >| m2 >, where the | ai > and | mi > (for i = 1, 2) are 
eigenstates of A and M, respectively. Then the reduced states PB # of S and # PB of M are 
mixtures of the respective eigenstates and the probabilities are calculated via (5.2b), 
according to our assumption. But S + M is in a pure non-eigenstate of A + M, hence the ‘as 
if’-version (5.2a) applies. Since e.g. Tr (Pm1 (# PB)) = Tr ((Pa1  Pm1) PB) (where Pa1 and Pm1 
project onto rays containing | a1 > and | m1 >, respectively, in the respective subspaces) we 
have that p (m1) = p (“a1” & “m1”) and since PB is a perfectly correlated state also p (m1) = 
p (“m1”). Now, events « mi » & mi are also perfectly correlated (for otherwise we blur the 
distinction between (5.2a and 5.2b)). Hence, p (m1) = p (“m1”) = p (« m1 » & m1) = p (m1). 
This means that p (m1) = p (m1) = ¾. Hence, we cannot plausibly treat mixtures via (5.2a). 
Suppose alternatively that we treat mixtures like pure non-eigenstates of A, i.e. apply an ‘as 
if’-interpretation as in (5.2a). Assume that the system in question is the measurement 
apparatus M, that there is an observable M on M and that the state of S + M is a 
superposition such that M’s reduced state # P (t1) = i ai Pmi, where the Pmi project onto the 
pointer eigenstates. Then for this state (of M!) the conditions for (5.2a) are in place. Hence, 
we have probabilities p (“mi”) = p (« mi » & mi) (for all i), i.e. each probability concerns the 
event that the M-measurement apparatus M is in a situation that is as if M had mi at t1 and 
M does not have mi at t1 (for all i). But M is an observable accessible to the naked eye. So QM 
plus (5.2a, b) proposes that direct observation of a macroscopic object is regularly mistaken 
and universally so, if we have reason to believe the observed object M is in a non-eigenstate 
of the pointer observable.  
We need to hear nothing further, I believe. An empirical theory that must assume systematic 
error in the direct observations eventually testing it is absurd. So the ‘as if’-proposal fails not 
only as a general proposal for the trace formula, but also in terms of its content.23 Hence, the 
only tangible proposal not obeying the value assumption fails. The argument of sec.3 
remains intact. 
                                                                 
23 Note also that the measurement problem, in the second version above, is trivially dissolved. Nothing 
prohibits that we calculate probabilities for the values of pointer observables (of a macroscopic 
apparatus) from the trace formula. But these must now, of course, also be probabilities for ‘as if’-events. 
Consider the probability p(“[M] = m1 at t3”) deduced from a state W (t3) of S + M and t3 is the end of the 
S-M interaction. We have a probability for a situation that is as if M showed m1 at t3 while M does not in 
fact show m1 at t3. If we take to heart this interpretation then there can of course be no measurement 
problem. This problem was that we see, e.g., [M] = m1 at t3 while the superposition affecting M prohibits 
(via EE) that [M] = m1 at t3. But given the ‘as if’-interpretation our vision is deceptive anyway. It is not 
the case that [M] = m1 at t3. If our observations are by assumption fallacious they can be in conflict with 
ascribed QM states but the conflict is harmless just because they are fallacious. Cancelling one of two 
contradictory statements always removes a contradiction. 
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6. Consequences 
The argument here developed shows that EE, the standard interpretation of QM 
completeness originating with Dirac and von Neumann, is implausible. Given State 
Uniqueness, EE entails COMP, which cannot be true under plausible assumptions. This may 
seem but a minor result. While many theoreticians not concerned with the foundations of 
QM still reproduce EE many others concerned with these foundations reject it right away. 
But the above result is of considerable strength. First of all, adopting or rejecting EE in the 
past often was a matter of general interpretive preferences, so any argument relating it to 
the structure of QM itself must be welcome. Moreover, in the presence of State Uniqueness, 
which is a property of QM anyway, COMP is weaker than EE, hence the result is stronger. 
Finally, the assumptions made are mostly very general and so the argument should guide 
our future thought about time-references in the formalism of QM. 
Of course, if the result is any good then its trivial consequence is that, given the 
assumptions, the negation of COMP is true. But the discussion hopefully has highlighted 
what exactly this negation is: If S is in some state W (t) such that for an arbitrary observable 
Pak the trace formula yields: 1 > p (ak) = Tr (W (t) Pak) > 0 (i.e. W (t) is a non-eigenstate of A), 
then this must be explicated by the internal interpretation, hence must explicitly run:  
p (ak (t)) > 0 and it must be legitimate to assume that S has value ak of A at time t – even when 
W (t) is a pure non-eigenstate of A. It should be obvious that this conclusion, if inescapable, has 
radical implications. Let me nevertheless illustrate them by means of a well-known and 
elegant KS variant due to Mermin (1990). Let S be a two-particle spin ½ system (hence we 
must have a space H with dim H = 4) and consider (for an orthogonal triple x, y, z of vectors 
in R³) these nine spin observables: σ1x, σ2x, σ1y, σ2y, σ1x σ2x, σ1y σ2y, σ1x σ2y, σ1y σ2x, σ1z σ2z. 
Writing again [A] for the value of an observable A, one can derive: 
[σ1x] [σ2x] [σ1x σ2x]   =  1 
[σ1x] [σ2y] [σ1x σ2y]   =  1 
[σ1y] [σ2x] [σ1y σ2x]   =  1 
[σ1y] [σ2y] [σ1y σ2y]   =  1 
[σ1x σ2y] [σ1y σ2x] [σ1z σ2z]  =  1 
[σ1x σ2x] [σ1y σ2y] [σ1z σ2z]  =            –1 
The derivation uses the constraints mentioned in sec.2.2: Functional Composition (here the 
Product Rule: [AB] = [A] [B]) and Noncontextuality (every operator represents a unique 
observable such that two occurrences of some [A] have the same value). The result is so 
elegant because the impossibility is so easy to see. Since every value appears twice the 
product of all the left sides must be positive, while the one of all the right sides is negative. 
Now let S be in the singlet state. Then it is straightforward to show that all nine observables 
get strictly positive probabilities. Hence, given  COMP, it must be possible to assume that 
all nine observables have values at time t. Since this is impossible given the two constraints 
at least one of them must be false. 
The problem outlined should direct further research in the foundations of QM. As indicated 
the measurement problem over which so much ink has been spilled is a consequence of 
yoking COMP and QM together despite the hidden inconsistency I have tried to uncover 
here. The only conclusion I can see is that attempts to resolve the measurement problem are 
misguided and that we must again investigate hidden-variables interpretations more 
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seriously. It should give us pause to see that elementary textbooks of QM directed at 
undergraduates and ignorant of interpretational subtleties rectify, without further ado, 
equivalents of p (ak) = Tr (W (t) Pak) into p (ak (t)) = Tr (W (t) Pak), that theoretical physicists 
defining transition probabilities and propagators do so as well as those trying to wed 
quantum theories and general relativity while orthodox interpretations either ignore the 
problem or, via the measurement-outcome idea, smuggle in references to times other than t 
that simply are not provided by W (t). To my mind, all this recommends a sincere look at 
how far away we are from understanding QM. 
The next logical step is to try and answer which of the two conditions – Functional 
Composition and Noncontextuality – QM systems violate. If we look at the two possibilities 
of contextuality discussed in the (not so recent) literature then measurement-induced 
Contextuality is not an option because, as we saw, QM systems possess the properties for 
which we make QM predictions at measurement onset. The alternative, called Ontological 
Contextuality (see Redhead 1987, 137), is little more than a label and so far it is nothing that 
can guide an understanding of the non-Boolean lattice structure of QM observables. But 
here, to my mind, should be the starting point for future research. Finally, it should be 
pointed out that the argument relates predictions of properties of QM systems to the times 
of measurement onset in measurements of these systems. This does entail that the properties 
measured in a QM system exist in it at measurement onset, but it does not entail that 
measurement is faithful in the sense of revealing pre-existing properties. QM properties 
might very well be relational in the sense of being relations between system and apparatus 
or between system and observer. It is just that these properties, if they are relations, come 
into existence, at the latest, at the time system and apparatus meet. To make sense of QM 
under these conditions is certainly a fundamental task for present philosophy of physics.  
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